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THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN CHINA 
.Jt c. P. Fitzgerald 
George Ernest Morrison first went to China in 1895, and from that time until 
his death in 1920 he lived in the Far East continuously, first as Peking 
correspondent of the London Times, finally as political adviser to the 
President of China. His son, Ian Morrison, whose tragic death last summer in 
Korea cut short a career of great promise, had already succeeded to his 
father's old post and was correspondent for The Times in the Far East. I The 
lives of these two Australians, together with the career of a third, W. H. Donald,2 
thus cover the whole period of the Chinese Revolution from its first 
preliminary portents in the Reform Movement of 1898 to the final tremendous 
explosion of our own times. Dr Morrison, perhaps the most famous of all the 
correspondents of The Times, did more than any man of his epoch to make 
the affairs of China intelligible to the Western world. The work of his son, 
nearly half a century later, will be remembered for the same gifts : cool, logical 
appraisement of conflicting reports and shrewd insight into the underlying 
trends which determine events. As a tribute to the memory of father and son 
I am going this evening to endeavour to examine the underlying causes of 
this great upheaval and trace the thread of the Chinese revolutionary tradition 
from earlier times up to the critical moment at which we find ourselves today. 
It is often believed that the revolutionary tradition is something unique 
to the Western world, an idea born of the French Revolution; but in China 
there has from velY ancient times existed a theory of revolution, which, 
although it was expressed in other terms, has yet many of the same basic ideas 
as that of the West. The Chinese, it is true, are not romantic, particularly in 
politics. China has never been a home of lost causes, and in the long range 
of Chinese histOlY there has never been a restoration, or even a movement 
of importance with such an end in view. This absence of the romantic outlook 
on politics is one of the most important differences between the Chinese 
tradition and our own, and only when the Chinese matter-of-fact approach 
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is understood can we appreciate the reasons why the Chinese revolution has 
developed as it has. The second main difference in the Chinese outlook is 
that in China Content has always mattered more than Form; Behaviour is 
more important than Belief; institutions are less significant than the character 
of the men who hold power. For this reason, although the Chinese have 
written much on the philosophy of government, they have never until the 
modern age questioned its form. All Chinese political philosophy was 
directed to the question of how to make the Monarch good; never was 
Monarchy as such questioned or doubted. Equally, dogmatic religion has 
never made headway in China, and therefore, although there exists a vast 
literature of ethical teaching and philosophic discussion, there has never 
been a Chinese institution corresponding to the Christian Church or the 
organised power of Islam. 
The absence of the romantic outlook and the lack of an organised 
priesthood left the Chinese scholar official a clear field for the formation of 
political and ethical theory. The political scientists of early China were also 
practical administrators, and it was they who formulated a famous theOlY 
which has deeply influenced all Chinese thought. The theOlY of the Mandate 
of Heaven-t'ien-ming �ifn' in Chinese-is certainly very early, but it is not 
necessary here to enter into the vexed question of its origin. It was stated in 
a famous passage by the philosopher Mencius %i r , who, being a Confucian, 
was supposed to venerate the early sage kings of China. An opponent, seek­
ing to embarrass the sage, asked him how he reconciled the fact that the 
founder of the Chou ]til dynasty, though a former minister of the preceding 
Shang rJj court, had rebelled against his sovereign and put him to death. Was 
such conduct right in a sage? Mencius replied: "I have heard of the execution 
of the criminal Chou Hsin, but not that a minister murdered his sovereign." 
Mencius thus claims that a king who governs badly, as Chou H sin *'1-$ of 
the Shang governed, ceases to be a real king and his murder is not a crime, 
but an execution. From this and similar concepts later ages developed the full 
theory of the Mandate of Heaven. In China there was no Divine Right of Kings. 
A king, or later an emperor, ruled by virtue of having received the Mandate 
of Heaven, a commission to rule the earth, limited by the condition that such 
rule must be just, sincere and righteous. If this condition was not fulfilled, 
then the monarch could no longer expect that his subjects would remain loyal 
and obedient. Rebellion against bad government was justified, and if the 
rebel succeeded and overturned the dynasty, by this fact it was plain that the 
Mandate of Heaven has passed from the fallen house and had been entrusted 
to the successful rebel. 
This extremely pragmatic theory, by which success was made a virtue and 
failure became a crime, has lived for centuries as the true unwritten Chinese 
constitution. It also constituted a continuing revolutionalY tradition of which 
every dynasty had to be aware. It may be asked how this theory operated in 
practice. A study of Chinese history shows that as a matter of fact the great 
rebellions rarely unseated the dynasty of the day. They shook the power of 
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the throne, they destroyed the administrative system and bred military rule 
in the provinces, but they were usually suppressed. Then, a few years later, 
the weak and helpless dynasty would be dethroned by one of the militalY 
adventurers called to power in the period when the late popular revolt was 
raging. This pattern is so recurrent that it must relate to some abiding social 
condition which continued in force for many centuries. As early as the Han 
il dynasty in the third century AD, the empire was shaken by the first of the 
great peasant rebellions, that of the Yellow Turbans :; r\J. This movement 
ravaged the provinces for years but was finally suppressed by newly raised 
armies. Then, a few years later, the army commanders who now controlled 
the government made the powerless emperor their plaything, and finally, 
almost unnoticed, the Han dynasty was dethroned. 
Several centuries later, towards the end of the great T'ang }gf dynasty, the 
same series of events occurred. A great rebellion, peasant in support, led by 
a disappointed office seeker, swept the empire and even took the capital. 
Armies raised by the Court finally crushed the rebels. Within twenty years, 
however, these new armies, warring among themselves, swept the T'ang 
empire from the throne. The same pattern can be seen in the most recent 
dynasty, that of the Manchus. The T'ai P'ing 7;:..5j2- Rebellion, which in the middle 
of the nineteenth century all but dethroned the dynasty, was a peasant move­
ment also led by a disgruntled member of the literate class. It, too, was finally 
suppressed, and as before, a generation later the feeble Manchu Court was 
easily turned off the throne by an ambitious militarist, Yuan Shih-k'ai Rt!t\1JL. 
Only one exception exists, and when this case is examined it gives a clue 
to the meaning of these events. In the later part of the fourteenth century 
China was under the rule of the Mongol Yuan :71:; dynasty, an alien and hated 
domination, which had denied to the Chinese literate class their traditional 
role in the government, and imported an international bureaucracy of foreign 
adventurers to rule the country. One of these, incidentally, was Marco Polo. 
After fifty years or so the Mongol rule became not only oppressive but 
inefficient. Rebellions broke out, and finally one of the leaders of these 
popular risings, a man of base origin, son of famine refugees, who had been 
in turn a beggar, a Buddhist monk, a bandit and a rebel leader, this man of 
the people founded the Ming dynasty and died forty years later one of the 
greatest emperors of China. Here indeed is the Mandate of Heaven in full 
operation. But the case of Ming Hung-wu Bfl#!;J£t is not at all typical. In his 
day the Chinese were, perhaps for the first time in their history, moved by 
a genuine wave of true national feeling, and, above all, the ruling dynasty had 
antagonised and ignored the scholar class, China's traditional rulers. 
Therein is the secret of Ming Hung-wu's success and the failure of the 
Yellow Turbans, Huang Ch'ao .;: � of the T'ang and the T'ai P'ing Heavenly 
King. All were popular revolts of the peasants against gross misgovernment. 
But only the rising of Ming Hung-wu had the support of the scholars also. 
He alone had both the ingredients for successful revolution :  the support of 
the peasantry and the backing of the literate scholar-gentry. 
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If we consider the origin and actions of the successful 
Figure 1 
Han Kao-tsu (source: Li-tai ku-jen-tsan, edition 
1476-courte,IY Prof Liu TS'un-yan) 
founders of the great dynastic regimes we find the same facts. 
The founder of the Han dynasty was a peasant soldier, hardly 
literate. He won the empire by military force, and at first showed 
little interest in the scholars. According to tradition, one day, 
as he was riding forth from his palace, a scholar kneeled before 
him, offering a bundle of books and saying: "Majesty, I have 
here something you need to govern the Empire. " Han Kao-tsu 
vt�m smacked his saddle and replied : "On horseback I 
conquered the Empire : what need have I of books?" To which 
the scholar replied : "Yes. Majesty, but can you also govern it 
from the saddle?" Struck by this question, Han Kao-tsu henceforth 
employed scholars in his government. The story, probably 
legendary, certainly epitomises the well-known change of 
conduct followed by the first Han Emperor, which went far to 
consolidate his empire. 
The founder of the T'ang, the true founder, was the second 
son of the titular emperor of that dynasty and was both a 
scholar himself and a soldier of genius. He is the ideal emperor 
of Chinese history, the perfect example of what the Chinese 
hoped for in their rulers. But he, too, was careful to enlist the 
support of the people by good treatment and, though an 
aristocrat, did not rely wholly on his fellows. The founder of 
the Sung *=, a professional soldier, who gained power by a 
mutiny of the army, consolidated his rule by disbanding that army and reliev­
ing the wants of the people. Thus is can be seen that the great peasant revolts 
failed unless in exceptional circumstances they had the support of the 
scholar-gentlY also, and the founders of the great dynasties, men of varying 
origin, all succeeded through combining the support of the scholars with real 
measures of relief for the peasants. Dynasties founded by military tyrants who 
neglected one or other of these ruled did not endure. Dynasties, such as the 
Manchu Ch'ing?� dynasty, which were founded by nomad conquerors, had 
to conciliate the Chinese scholars to survive, and to relieve the peasants if 
they were to remain in power. The Mongols, who did neither, hardly held 
the throne for more than a full lifetime. 
With this background it seems as if the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 
was an event fully in accordance with Chinese historical tradition, and should 
have been followed by the usurpation of some military man, who, if really able, 
might have founded an enduring dynasty, but would more probably have been 
the first of a series of short-lived regimes forming what the Chinese call a 'Period 
of Confusion'. Looked at from one point of view, the events since the fall of 
the Manchus have been just that, and the transitory regimes of the early 
Republic, the Kuomintang \EIJ�'5't, and the Japanese invasion could be seen 
as the brief dynasties of such an interim, before the foundation of the new, 
mighty and enduring dynasty, in this case the People's Republic of China. 
But such an interpretation of the Chinese Revolution would be altogether 
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too formalistic and conservative. Other and mighty influences have come to 
disrupt and distort the ancient pattern of dynastic succession. Two great 
changes had occurred to alter the whole framework in which Chinese history 
had hitherto operated. The conquests of the Manchu emperors in Mongolia, 
combined with the advance of Russia across the Siberian steppes, had 
eliminated for ever the age-old danger of nomad invasion from which China 
had suffered since the dawn of history. It had, moreover, brought China into 
contact with the Russian Empire and thus opened a channel through which 
in due course powerful new influences were to reach the Chinese culture. 
At the same time the European nations had found and developed the sea 
route to the Far East. Thus ended China's long geographical isolation, and the 
mental attitudes which that isolation had bred, and which were appropriate 
to such a condition, were found wholly unfitted to cope with the new 
situation. The Manchu indifference to the power of the Western world, their 
unwillingness to admit the existence of that power, or to prepare to meet the 
dangers which now threatened from the sea, were a consequence of the long 
and traditional preoccupation with the land frontier to the north, the line of 
the Wall, which had for all Chinese governments been the only real problem 
of foreign affairs. It was found too difficult, after this ancient problem had at 
last, by the conquest of Mongolia, been settled for ever, to wrench the mind 
away from it and realise that the sea coast, hitherto unimportant as a frontier, 
was now the region in which peril appeared. One may compare the preoccu­
pation of the British military in India with the North-West Frontier, and their 
inability to realise that their real danger came from the north-east if Japan 
should invade China. 
Another domestic factor had entirely changed the Chinese scene. During 
the long internal peace of the Manchu dynasty the Chinese population had 
grown, possibly by over one hundred millions. Pressure on the land in a 
purely agrarian economy was becoming intense. Moreover, the advent of the 
Western traders and the industrialisation of Japan had flooded China with 
cheap manufactures which drove out and destroyed the handicraft industries 
which had helped the peasants to make ends meet. In the latter years of the 
Manchu dynasty the peasants were becoming more and more numerous and 
poorer every year. The Westerners, seeing the growth of their trading cities 
on the coast, where formerly there had only been mud flats or fishing ports, 
boasted of the benefits they were bringing to China. In the villages these 
changes were seen in another light. The increasing misery of the people was 
a ferment beneath the surface of China's political life; an explosive force 
which, if too long compressed, would in the end blow the whole social 
system to fragments in a tremendous explosion. We in our day have seen this 
happen. 
The course of the Chinese Revolution from 1911 to the present year, 1951, 
falls naturally into four periods, each almost exactly a decade in length. The 
first ten years, from 1911 to 1921, is the period known in China as the age 
of the warlords, the chaotic rule of military dictators. In the second decade, 
from 1921 to 1931, the Revolution got its second wind, and rise of the Kuo-
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mintang, the Nationalist Party, appeared to be destined to settle the problems 
of the nation. In the third period, from 1931 to 1941,]apanese aggression and 
invasion dominated all other factors and created new problems; while in the 
final decade, from 1941 to 1951, the Chinese Revolution ceased to be a local 
and national crisis and became a movement caught up in the full tide of world 
affairs, in which it plays a part, the significance of which is only now 
becoming painfully clear to the West. 
The Manchu dynasty abdicated the throne in February 1911, not as the 
direct result of the republican rising led by Dr Sun Yat-sen i%�1w, but 
because its own commander-in-chief, the reactionary and ambitious Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, who expected to found a new dynasty, compelled the Regent to 
renounce power. Yuan in fact, being an old-time scholar as well as a general, 
expected that the well-tried pattern of history would now repeat itself. In the 
first years of the new regime he became President of the Republic, and then 
skilfully used his power to eliminate the leading republicans and place his 
own supporters in the key posts. Early in 1916 he was ready to carry out his 
coup and the new dynasty was proclaimed. The result was a great surprise 
both to the pretender and to the foreign powers, who all favoured his attempt. 
There were at once risings in remote provinces, followed by secessions 
in nearer garrisons, and in a wide movement of protest among the educated 
class. Yuan's own generals were either luke-warm or openly opposed him. 
He had to renounce his plans and died a few months later, a broken man. 
The failure of Yuan and the most unexpected sentiment against the monarchy 
seemed inexplicable to most observers at the time and requires explanation. 
Three factors worked against Yuan. Firstly, his own character, which was 
treacherous and deceitful. He had already twice betrayed those who had put 
their trust in him; there was the Emperor Kuang-hsi.i 7t*il , in the reform 
movement of 1898, who had trusted Yuan, and had been by him betrayed 
to the ruthless and reactionalY Empress Dowager. Then the Regent, who had 
made Yuan commander-in-chief against the republicans, only to be turned 
off the throne by the man on whom he relied. The Chinese value loyalty 
highly, far more highly than they value liberty or what we call democratic 
freedoms, and the people never respected or trusted Yuan, who is now 
bracketed with two or three other famous traitors in popular memory. 
Secondly,]apan worked against the pretender, fearing that his success would 
result in the founding of a strong China. The]apanese Twenty-One Demands, 
presented at pistol-point to Yuan on the eve of his monarchical coup, 
amounted to the establishment of a protectorate over China. If Yuan had had 
the courage and insight to reject these outright and lead the nation in what 
might have been a desperate, and certainly at first a losing, war, he would 
perhaps have become a real national leader and might have also become the 
founder of an enduring dynasty, for China was by no means truly republican 
or democratic in sentiment in 1916. He chose, however, to accept many of 
the demands and intrigue with foreign nations to obtain their support in 
rejecting or postponing the others. In this way he angered the]apanese, lost 
face with the Chinese, and got no real or useful help from the foreign nations, 
THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN CHINA 
who were as ever, too divided among themselves and too jealous of each 
other to agree on any positive or effective China policy. 
The third factor which worked for Yuan's downfall was the jealousy and 
ambition of his subordinates, who feared that as the generals and ministers 
of an emperor they would cut a smaller figure than might be possible as rival 
contenders for supreme power. Added to this was the old hostility of the 
south for a northerner (Yuan was from Honan) and the vague anti-monarch­
ical sentiment of many of the younger literate class. It is certainly not the case 
that Yuan was frustrated by a surge of democratic feeling or republican 
enthusiasm; the republican party led by Dr Sun Yat-sen played practically no 
part in his overthrow. Yuan's coup had thus failed to win the support of the 
scholars and had none from the peasants. 
This was one of the prime causes of the anarchy which followed his death. 
The republicans entrenched themselves in Canton, where Dr Sun for some 
years headed a precarious separate government, often menaced and only 
fitfully supported by the local militarists. The Peking government became 
the prize for contending military chieftains, who ruled their provinces as 
independent autocrats. At this time China was really divided into some ten 
or twelve shifting military despotisms, the Peking government being little 
more than a convenient symbol for use in diplomatic intercourse and loan 
raising. Although it was no longer fashionable to proclaim the foundation 
of a dynasty as the aim, almost all the militarists either had that intention or 
toyed with the idea of restoring the Manchus as puppet rulers. One actually 
carried out such a restoration in 1917, which lasted a week. As men they were 
for the most part destitute of any political ideas, bad administrators, corrupt, 
and brutal. 
The period of military chaos lasting from 1917 to 1927 had a profound and 
lasting effect on China, though little of its real importance was realised at the 
time. In the first place the democratic Republican ideal was wholly discredit­
ed, since the forms of this system were used by the military despots to cover 
their acts. The people, the scholars, and the revolutionaries themselves were 
now all disillusioned with the kind of government so confidently imported 
a few years earlier from Europe and America. The next phase of the revo­
lution was about to begin, and in it, all unnoticed, the ideological initiative 
had passed to Russia. 
A second profound effect of the warlord rule was the rising distress of the 
peasantry. Under the old system of Imperial China the landlord class, who 
were not large-scale holders in the European manner, lived in their villages, 
having intimate contact with their tenants, and without any military force to 
overawe the peasants. When harvests were good they exacted their rents ; 
when harvests were poor, they were wise enough to remit a part of the rent 
due, and when famine came, if they were wise, they opened their own gran­
aries and relieved the starving. If they were too greedy and too heartless, the 
peasants, who were far more numerous, would rise and slay them. There was 
no military force worth the name in the interior. If a rebellion occurred the 
Emperor either raised forces for the occasion or sent commissioners to 
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historians with a living, stale and 
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enquire into the cause, remit taxation and distribute rice or grain. This, with 
the arrest and execution of the rapacious officials guilty of too much squeeze, 
often served to tranquillise the trouble. 
Under the Republic all was changed; vast armies of armed hooligans 
called soldiers wandered over the country, devouring the crops and robbing 
the villagers. The rich landlords fled from such conditions to the safety of the 
big cities-often to the foreign concessions in the Treaty Ports. They left 
agents behind to collect their rents, without knowing or caring what the 
harvests might be. The agents found that the easiest way to carry out their 
tasks, and enrich themselves at the same time, was to go into partnership with 
the local military. Soldiers would be lent to help exact the full rent, the full 
tax and even taxes for years to come. If the peasants resisted, they could now 
be shot, and whereas before the peasant with his spear or scythe was almost 
a match for a soldier armed with a sword or spear, the new army, with its rifles 
and guns, tyrannised supreme. All went to rack and ruin: the dykes which 
hold back the flood-waters were not repaired; the military had embezzled the 
money set aside for the purpose. There was no remission of rent or tax in bad 
years, but only greater exactions to feed the hordes of soldiers and enrich the 
corrupt officials who followed them. By 1923 the condition of the countryside 
was deplorable, and a vast unrest was seething beneath the selfish and intol­
erable rule of the army. The rule of the warlords had alienated both scholars 
and peasants and thus was doomed. 
Meanwhile new influences had come in to rejuvenate the moribund 
revolution. China's claims to her own territories had been pushed aside in 
favour of Japan at the Versailles Peace Conference. The Chinese Renaissance 
Movement, a most creative change in literary style and educational method, 
had swept through the universities. From all these forces, cultural, foreign 
and economic, was born the second, and much greater, explosion of the 
revolution. In 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was formed in Shanghai. 
Mao Tse-tung was one of the founder members. In the same year Dr Sun Yat­
sen conferred with Joffe, the envoy of the USSR, and concluded with him an 
agreement for joint action between the Chinese Communist and Nationalist 
parties. The Kuomintang, Dr Sun's party, was at the same time reorganised 
on the lines of the Russian Communist Party, and Dr Sun, though declaring 
Communism unsuitable for China, renounced his earlier belief in parliamentary 
government in favour of a one-party state, which should keep the people in 
tutelage until they were politically mature. 
Thus, still almost unremarked, and certainly not comprehended by the 
West, the Chinese Revolution as long ago as 1921 turned definitely away from 
the democratic ideals of Europe and America. The move in politics was 
obvious enough, had anyone then cared to study Chinese politics or thought 
Chinese affairs important ; but in literature, which could not be easily read or 
known to the West, the movement was even more significant. The Russian 
envoys who came to Peking in the early twenties were ostracised by the 
diplomatic corps. They were entertained, even feted, by the Chinese intellect-
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uals. Russian literature became extremely popular and was freely translated 
in the following years. The governments of the militarists neither knew nor 
cared what the people thought, and exercised no censorship. 
A few years after the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party and 
reorganisation on Russian lines of the Nationalist Party, the two revolutionary 
movements allied themselves to overthrow the government of the militarists. 
The Northern Expedition, as, starting from Canton, it was called, 
opened in the early summer of 1926 and by autumn all China south of Figure 4 
the Yangtse had fallen to the revolutionary advance. Later in the year Lin Piao (1907-1971), at the time 
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the great twin cities of Hankow and Wuchang on the River fell and were 
made the temporary capital of the new regime. The Communists and 
the Nationalists were sill in close alliance. Moscow, indeed, was 
continually urging the Chinese Communists not to differ with or 
oppose the Nationalist policies. But the tension between the two wings 
was growing acute. As the revolutionary armies swept through the 
southern provinces the Communist rural organisers who went with 
them (one of whom was Mao Tse-tung) stirred up the discontent of the 
peasants and alarmed and alienated the landlords and their agents. 
When the army approached Shanghai, China's greatest industrial city, 
then mainly under foreign rule, the Chinese part of the city rose and 
seized factories and police stations, driving out the northern military. 
This movement, which was a brilliantly planned coup, effected in a 
night, was organised and led by Chou En-Iai )l!iJ �,* , now Premier of 
China. At this moment the revolution was supported by both peasants 
and the educated and thus triumphed. 
Commander-in-Chief q( the Communist 
forces in Manchuria, a photograph taken 
outside his residence in Harbin in 1946, 
shortly hefore the resumption of the Civil 
War in which he was to playa decisive role. 
Renowned for his brilliant military strategy, 
Lin, together with his family and close 
followers, was reportedly shot down on 11 
September 1971 over Outer Mongolia as the 
result of a plot engineered by Mao [-LHMJ 
(photograph courtesy of Lo Hui-min) 
The Nationalist army was commanded by Chiang Kai-shek �4fr E , 
a relatively young officer, trained in Japan and Russia. He was, however, 
no friend of the Communists and already planned to rupture the 
alliance once the capture of Shanghai would give him the backing of 
the right-wing financial interest in that city. Soon after entering Shanghai 
he made a sudden attack on the worker corps, which had taken the 
town, and massacred them in large numbers. Chou En-Iai escaped by 
a rare chance. Chiang then set up his own right-wing anti-Communist 
government in Nanking and denounced the government in Hankow, 
which was still in alliance with the Communists. Within a short time the 
two nationalist governments came to agreement and outlawed the 
Communist Party. Moscow, deceived to the last, was still urging the 
Chinese Communists to keep friends with the Nationalists, even when 
the latter were already arresting and shooting the Communist leaders. 
The Communists, however, were not without support. Part of the 
Fourth Army, which had proved itself the most efficient of the revo­
lutionary armies on the Northern Expedition, mutinied on August 1st, 
1928, at Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province. The Commander of this 
force was Chu Teh *f� , now Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese 
Army. One of his leading officers was Lin Piao **If�, the general 
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responsible for the final destruction of the Nationalist forces in 1949, and now 
commanding the Chinese expedition to Korea. Round the Red Army the 
fugitive Communists rallied, but at first, following the advice of Moscow as 
given to the Communist Party leader in China, the Red Army was velY 
unsuccessful. The Russians, in true Marxist style, advised the Chinese 
Communists to seize large cities where there was a worker class who should 
be their supporters. The Chinese tried to seize such cities-Canton, Foochow, 
Changsha-and were heavily defeated. The workers in them were mostly 
old-fashioned craftsmen, unorganised, uninterested and afraid. 
After failing to take or hold such cities the Red Army, very much reduced 
in size, was wandering about south China, hotly pursued by the forces of the 
Nationalist Government. At this time, the lowest ebb of the fortunes of the 
Chinese Communists, Mao Tse-tung -=sii -* and Chu Teh joined forces on 
the mountain in Hunan which became their last refuge. No longer in touch 
with the Central Committee of the party and its Russian advisers, Chu and Mao 
had to fend for themselves, and there devised the policy of 
land reform and support for peasant interests, which proved 
Li Li-san (1900-67), photographed standing on the 
frozen Sungari Riverf'�7t.rr in late 1946 when he 
was in charge, among other things, of external 
relations in Communist Manchuria. Born in the year 
(f the Boxer Uprising, this former head of the Chinese 
Communist Party was to die in gaol on 22 June 1967 
at the height of the 'Cultural Revolution' [-LI-fMJ 
(photograph courtesy of Lo I-fui-min) 
the foundation of the party's power in later years. This policy 
was criticised by the doctrinaire Marxists in Russia and the 
Treaty Ports. It was, of course a Chinese policy, based on 
Chinese revolutionary tradition, not Russian or Marxist. It is 
almost certain that Mao was for a time actually expelled from 
the party. He was certainly, by his own confession to Edgar 
Snow,3 deprived of his post on the Central Executive Com­
mittee. During the first years of the Chinese Soviet in Kiangsi 
and Hunan the Chinese Communist Party was in schism with 
Moscow. This fact every Communist is now at pains to cover 
up or explain away. It was not until it became obvious that not 
only was the heretical Chinese peasant policy of Mao Tse-tung 
a success, but that it was building a base for the Red Army 
which rendered the latter able to repel and defeat many anti­
Communist extermination drives by Chiang Kai-shek. It was 
not till these facts were well known that Moscow saw the error 
of her ways, jettisoned her obedient instrument, the Chinese 
Communist leader Li Li-san *.rr=., and recognised Mao as 
Chairman of the Party. Today Li Li-san's policy (albeit dictated 
by Moscow) is official dubbed the Li Li-san heresy in the works 
of Mao Tse-tung. The heretic, however, still occupies an 
important post in the regime. Mao's peasant policy had gained 
one pillar of support for the Communist Party, but the other, 
the backing of the educated class, had not been obtained. 
However important the early history of the Chinese 
Communist Party may now seem, the obscure struggles of 
Mao and Chu in the Hunan mountains were little considered 
at the time. In the third decade of the Chinese Revolution it 
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was the personality of Chiang Kai-shek and the politics of his Nanking 
government which dominated the scene. Few Chinese, except ardent 
converts, then considered the Communist Party a serious competitor for 
power. Even when the Red Army for four years successfully repelled Chiang's 
extermination drives, people wondered at their skill and resolute defence, 
but never thought they were on the road to ultimate victory. The excesses 
which the Communists undoubtedly committed on landlords at this period, 
before the policy of New Democracy had been adopted, alienated educated 
opinion, even among those who disliked the Kuomintang. Thus in 1929 the 
Kuomintang had lost the peasants, but the Communists had not won the 
scholars. 
The political history of this decade is the story of the failure of the liberal 
Nationalists to carry on the reforming movement of the Revolution, particularly 
in the country, and the rise of the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. The 
generalissimo and his adherents evidently thought the Revolution had now 
entered the Napoleonic phase: the Shanghai massacres had been the Chinese 
'whiff of grapeshot', and the Revolution had now turned respectable. 
Unfortunately Chiang was no Napoleon. Instead of being invariably victorious 
in battle, he was in these years constantly and signally defeated by the far 
smaller Red Army. Instead of rallying the nation in heroic and successful 
opposition to the foreign invader, he pursued a policy of yielding to Japanese 
pressure which cost the loss of Manchuria without resistance, the Japanese 
domination of North China, half-heartedly opposed, and the Japanese 
invasion at Shanghai in 1932, which the local troops gallantly resisted, with­
out receiving any support from the Central Government. While the military 
record of the Kuomintang regime was inglorious, the political developments 
were steadily tending away from democratic or liberal ideals, and displayed 
an increasing tendency to imitate the methods and ideas of Italian Fascism . 
The regime was supposed to be preparing for constitutional government, but 
in fact the successive proposed draft constitutions were always more and 
more authoritarian, and such limitations as they allowed upon the power of 
the President were in practice never heeded by the actual head of the State. 
The decade from 1928 to 1937 was the period of the reaction. 
In the years 1935-36 the Communist army, after suffering greatly from 
blockade in its southern stronghold, broke out in the famous Long March, an 
amaZing feat, which took the whole Communist community across the 
breadth and length of China, by wild and inaccessible routes, until it occupied 
and established itself in the extreme north-west of the country. The reasons 
for this great march were not merely the pressure of the Nationalist blockade; 
the Communists already, like other Chinese, saw that war with Japan was 
inevitable if the country were not to be conquered piecemeal ; they had 
already issued an empty and propagandist declaration of war on Japan, and 
the march to the north-west put then in a region where, when Japan invaded 
China, they would be on the flank of the invasion, and in a good position to 
exploit the opportunities which such conditions would create. 
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Another reason for their march and new policy of urging national unity 
in resistance to the Japanese was that Chiang's policy of 'internal pacification 
before resistance to external pressure', or hunting the Communists while 
yielding to the Japanese, was becoming extremely unpopular. By espousing 
the popular anti-Japanese attitude before the Kuomintang, and be forcing the 
latter to accede to this policy, the Communists in 1936-37 regained all their 
lost ground and were henceforth held in growing esteem by large sections 
of the public which had hitherto feared them. The Sian incident in early 1937, 
when Chiang was imprisoned by mutinous officers from Manchuria who 
wished to end the war with the Communists and fight the Japanese instead, 
gave the Communist Party its opportunity. Chou En-Iai, Communist delegate 
to the mutinous army in Sian, saved Chiang's life that he might live to lead 
the Nationalist Party to a peaceful settlement of the internal war and a united 
front against Japan. Chiang, unwillingly submitting to this necessity, never 
acknowledged Chou's part, and later broke his word to his pardoned captor 
Chang Hsueh-liang, whom he has ever since held prisoner. 
For the time there was a truce to the civil war, and before long the Japan­
ese struck near Peking in July, 1937, and the open war began. What proved 
of real importance in that war, which endured till the Japanese surrender in 
1945, was not the battles won or lost, but the slow change which war brought 
in the relative strength of the contending Chinese parties. The Japanese made 
many blunders: firstly, they alienated the peasants by the brutality and 
violence of their troops. They failed to occupy the rural areas effectively, but 
plunged far into the interior. This policy played into the hands of the Com­
munists. The Japanese destroyed the cities, but left the countryside under 
such loose control that Communist guerrillas were quickly able to infiltrate 
and organise widespread resistance. As the Japanese pushed on west they 
constantly diminished the power of the Kuomintang, but actually increased 
the areas in which the Communist Party could operate and flourish. Resist­
ance in the so-called occupied areas became Communist resistance. The 
Nationalist armies, driven to the remote west, became immobile, dispirited, 
underfed and poorly armed. They were unable to do more than passively 
hold the mountain barriers. 
Behind these lines the Kuomintang decayed. Cut off from its one active 
and modern element, the city bourgeoisie of the ports, it fell under the control 
of the most reactionalY landlord class in China, the Szechuan militarists, upon 
whom the government had now to rely. Inflation ruined the middle class, 
corruption increased to giant proportions, jealousy and fear of the Communist 
successes bred oppression and police rule. When the war ended there was 
a vast disillusionment among the Chinese under Nationalist rule. The country 
had been ravaged and ruined, wealth was gone, inflation rampant, corruption 
in official life worse than ever, liberalism persecuted, and, worst of all in its 
psychological effect, was the universal knowledge that this victory had not 
been won by Chinese arms, but by those of America and the other allies. 
There could be no pride in victory, nor real hope of peace. 
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Even before the Japanese surrender the threat of civil war hung over the 
country. During the latter part of the war the truce between Nationalists and 
Communists had virtually broken down. There was not much fighting 
between them, but Chiang blockaded the Communist area so that even 
medical drugs could not be sent by the International Red Cross to the 
Communist forces. At the surrender the Communists claimed the right to take 
over the cities in the regions they dominated. The Allied High Command, 
recognising only the Nationalist Government ,  refused this claim and flew in 
Kuomintang troops to occupy the northern cities. The Japanese were ordered 
to resist any Communist attempt to enter these cities first. 
While thus taking a decisive step in support of the government of Chiang, 
the United States also sought to avert the civil war by sending General 
Marshall to mediate between the two parties and establish a coalition. At first, 
in 1946, it seemed as if he might have some chance of success. The military 
position was a stalemate. The Communists occupied all rural northern and 
eastern China, but though they cut the railways and roads, the Kuomintang 
occupied the cities and could communicate by air. The Kuomintang also 
occupied all western and southern China, apart from small guerrilla areas. 
Educated public opinion was then still indifferent to either ideology but 
overwhelmingly against civil war. "We do not want Civil War" was the slogan 
of the liberal Press. The peasants were already won by the Communists, but 
the scholars were still neutral. 
General Marshall failed; neither side would yield on vital matters. The 
Communists claimed a share in the government which would have made 
their policy dominant. This was wholly unacceptable to the right-wing 
Nationalists. Having issued a declaration condemning in equal terms the 
intransigence of both parties, General Marshall gave up his mission. But the 
United States continued to supply the Kuomintang with arms , munitions, 
aircraft and gasoline; training missions remained in Nanking and Formosa; 
thus while civil war became inevitable, the USA was actively helping one of 
the two sides which General Marshall had equally condemned. 
Open civil war began in the spring of 1947. At first the confused picture 
of gains and retreats led many Chinese to hope that inability to reach a 
decision would force the combatants back to negotiation. Throughout this 
year the educated public, heartily sick of war, hoped for a military stalemate. 
As yet there was no real swing of scholar opinion towards the Communist 
Party, although the Kuomintang had become generally detested for their 
corruption,  nepotism, oppression and inefficiency. The hope lay in a 
coalition which would bring in new men. But early in 1948 it began to be clear 
that the balance of success was swinging over to the Communist side. The 
Government's rapacity and its total inability to control inflation was fast 
alienating the last reserves of its public support. 
The Kuomintang, openly relying on American aid, had offended much 
real nationalist opinion; it had become a naked military despotism oppressive 
to all social classes. The peasants were wholly won over to the Communist 
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cause; the educated, utterly despairing of peace by negotiation, only hoped for 
an end of the war: any end; no one now cared at all who won or what they 
would do with victory. Late in 1948 it was clear who was going to win. The 
Communist victories in of the autumn had been decisive. Manchuria was gone; 
north China, too; and the People's Liberation Army now stood victorious on 
the banks of the Yangtse opposite Nanking. The Mandate of Heaven had 
changed hands and the issue was settled. Forthwith the great mass of the 
Chinese people changed too; a landslide of support was displaced and came 
down on the Communist side. In China nothing succeeds like success, and 
nothing fails more fatally than moral failure. The Kuomintang were down, and 
as the Chinese proverb puts it, "everyone pushes a falling wall. " 
The decisive factor in this change was the attitude of the intellectuals ,  the 
scholars of older times. The old rule of revolution in China still proved true. 
The Kuomintang had begun with the backing of the scholars, but had quickly 
lost the support of the peasants by refusing to carry the revolution into the 
villages. The Communists had soon won the goodwill of the peasants, but 
for many years their alien creed and violence had denied them the support 
of the educated class. It was only when, in 1947--48, the Kuomintang had been 
proved incapable of reform and destructive to the national survival that the 
scholars gave their wholehearted allegiance to the opposition led by the Com­
munist Party. From that moment the triumph of the revolution was assured. 
Yet this revolution was not made by the Communists; it was the work of 
the peasants and the scholars, the combination which had been necessary to 
all great changes throughout Chinese history. In 1948 the Communists, by 
offering the land to the peasants and peace and good government to the 
intellectuals, were able to align this combination on their side. This result was 
not secured because the opposition was Communist , but rather in spite of that 
fact, but so long as the peasants and scholars obtain from the new regime 
satisfactions which were formerly denied to them, their allegiance to this 
government, Communist though it be, is assured. If in the future the pursuit 
of Communist ideological aims leads the new regime into courses which 
alienate the peasants or the scholars, then, and not till then, the regime will 
be in danger of internal opposition. 
To men of Dr Morrison's generation the future course of the Chinese 
Revolution would have seemed incredible and repugnant; to his son Ian, who 
saw at first hand the final stages, it appeared rather as an inevitable explosion 
generated by forces which had long been gathering strength, and which no 
individual or group could hope to control. It is useless to argue whether a 
volcanic eruption is good or bad; it has to be accepted with all its violence 
and senseless destruction. After the eruption has subsided one may draw near 
across the hot and quaking earth to measure the changes in the landscape 
produced by so vast a convulsion. 
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